• Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh
  • University Grants Commission of Bangladesh
  • Asian Development Bank
  • Improving Computer Science Education Through Enhanced Practice (ICSETEP)
  • Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Daffodil International University

Sub-Project A-71 · ICSETEP

Development and Effective Application of AI-Based, Post-Quantum Cryptography-Enabled Counterfeit Medicine Identification Tools for Better Treatment Outcomes in Bangladesh.

Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Daffodil International University. Funded by the Government of Bangladesh and the Asian Development Bank under the UGC RDG-ICSETEP project.

Funded and administered by

  • Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh

    Funder

  • University Grants Commission of Bangladesh

    Grant authority

  • Asian Development Bank

    Co-financier

  • Improving Computer Science Education Through Enhanced Practice (ICSETEP)

    Programme

  • Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Daffodil International University

    Host department

01 / The story

A forgery does not have to be good. It only has to be good enough to hand over.

Counterfeit medicine is not a manufacturing problem that happens to involve drugs. It is a supply-chain problem: somewhere between the plant that made a genuine product and the pharmacy that sold it, something else was put in its place — and every party in between handled it believing it was the real thing.

That is what makes it hard to see. A forger does not need to replicate the medicine; they need to replicate the pack. The tablet, the vial, the carton, the batch number and the expiry date are all things that can be looked at and copied, and a copy that survives a glance at the counter has already done its job[16]. The patient is the last person in the chain and the only one with no way to check.

Detective Branch officers standing behind a table stacked with boxes of seized counterfeit medicine.© The Daily Star
Seized stock, Dhaka. Boxed, labelled and indistinguishable from the real thing until it was tested.
A worker tipping a drum of confiscated medicine and cosmetics onto a heap beside a river.© The Daily Star
Tk 10 crore of fake medicine, cosmetics and sanitiser destroyed in Barishal after a factory was found running inside a house.
A blister strip printed with an SMS short-code and the instruction to text it to verify the pack.© The Daily Star
A manufacturer’s own answer: text a code printed on the strip. The industry already accepts that the pack has to prove something.
A close render of a blister strip: four capsules seated in formed pockets of a single continuous sheet, with a second strip of tablets below.
The pack a patient is actually handed. Everything visible here — the brand, the strength, the pocket layout — is reproducible by anyone with the same press.
The same strips turned over, showing the printed lidding foil: MEDSECURE, the strength, a data-matrix code and the words SCAN TO VERIFY.
The same strips, turned over. The lidding foil is the printed side, and the only surface on a dose that survives the carton being thrown away.
COUNTERFEIT ENTERSsame brand, same batch number, same lookManufacturerKnows what it madeDistributorChecks paperworkWholesalerChecks paperworkPharmacyChecks the packPatientChecks nothing
Everyone downstream of the substitution handles the forged pack believing it genuine, because on every check available to them it is. The patient carries the consequence and holds the fewest means to detect it.

It is not hypothetical, and it is not rare.

The reporting below is Bangladeshi, published, and spans two decades. Every headline is the outlet’s own.

02 / The scale

How much of what is sold is not what it says it is.

Every figure below is a floor rather than a total. Counterfeit medicine is measured by what testing and enforcement happen to reach, and anything that worked well enough not to be questioned is never counted at all.

A Business Standard summary graphic: halothane banned from anaesthesia after adulteration was detected; police confiscated 4.96 lakh antibiotic tablets made of flour; a doctor states there are no drug specialists or pharmacists in senior DGDA posts.© The Business Standard
The Business Standard's own summary of the state of the supply, published April 2024. The figures on it are theirs, not ours — ours are below, and still waiting on sources.

600crore taka / year

Counterfeit medicine traded annually, on the drug makers’ own estimate — out of a Tk 18,000 crore market.[1]

~10% of antibiotics

Share of antibiotics sampled in Dhaka found counterfeit, adulterated or substandard. Outside Dhaka, researchers put it near twice that.[2]

2,500crore taka

Estimated value of fake medicine circulating in the open market at any one time.[3]

Both figures below are from one sentence of one source, which is what makes setting them against each other legitimate.[1]
Counterfeit
Tk 600 crore3.3%
The market it hides in
Tk 18,000 crore

Three per cent sounds survivable until it is read the other way round: it is the share by value, not by dose, and the cheapest products are the easiest to copy. A patient has no way of knowing which side of the bar the pack in their hand came from — which is the entire problem, stated arithmetically.

What is actually on the record.

There is no published year-by-year total of counterfeit medicine seized in Bangladesh — the DGDA reports enforcement activity for some years and not others, and the reporting covers individual raids rather than national figures. So this is the record as it exists: documented cases, each with the figure its own source states.

  1. 1991

    76 children died after taking adulterated paracetamol syrup

    76 deaths

    The first mass-casualty event on record. A child kidney specialist raised the alarm over adulterated drugs the same year.[7]

  2. 2009

    28 more children died, from a second adulterated paracetamol

    28 deaths

    Eighteen years after the first. The product was traced to Reed Pharma.[7]

  3. 2013

    Fake and unauthorised medicine seized at Mitford

    ≈ US$ 640,000

    Taken from the country’s central wholesale medicine hub — the point product passes through on its way to pharmacies nationwide.[8]

  4. 2020

    A factory inside a house, supplying Mitford for two years

    Tk 10 crore destroyed

    Fake medicine, cosmetics and sanitiser destroyed by a mobile court in Barishal. Two men were jailed for a year and fined Tk 5 lakh each.[10]

  5. 2017–2021

    Cumulative enforcement against manufacturers

    Tk 27 crore fined

    34 cases filed against firms over manufacturing fake medicine, and 202 mobile courts run, in the four years to 2021.[6]

  6. 2023

    A year of DGDA drives

    Tk 1.73 crore fined

    1,696 mobile courts, 8 drug courts and 447 magistrate courts. The same reporting notes no record of anyone imprisoned for manufacturing adulterated drugs.[5]

  7. 2023

    The High Court orders compensation for the 104

    Tk 15.6 crore awarded

    Tk 15 lakh to each family of the 76 children who died in 1991 and the 28 who died in 2009 — a reckoning arriving thirty-two years after the first of them.[7]

03 / Who pays

Three losses, from one substitution.

The manufacturer

A falsified product carries a real company's brand. The revenue goes to whoever made the copy, and the failure — when the medicine does not work — is attributed to the company whose name is on it. It loses the sale and the reputation in the same transaction.

The patient

An under-strength or inert product is not a neutral event. A course of antibiotics that does not clear an infection leaves a resistant one behind; a cardiac or oncology product that under-delivers spends a window that does not reopen.

The treatment

The deepest cost is epistemic. When a course fails, nobody can separate a wrong diagnosis from a right one served by a fake — so the conclusion drawn is that the treatment does not work, and the next prescription is written against evidence that was never real.

04 / The same patient

Same person. Same prescription. Two outcomes.

Hold everything constant — the condition, the molecule, the dose, the fact that the course was completed exactly as directed — and change one thing: whether the pack contained what the label promised.

The interior of a retail pharmacy in Bangladesh, staff behind a counter lined with shelves of boxed medicine.© The Business Standard
The counter is where the substitution becomes a patient's problem. Neither person in this transaction can tell, from the pack, which of the two outcomes below they are about to get.

Treated at home

Condition
Hypertension
Prescription
Same molecule, same dose
Pack bought
Locally, from a licensed pharmacy
What was in it
Under strength, or no active ingredient at all
Course completed
Yes — as directed, in full

Still ill.

Nothing in the encounter told anyone the medicine was the problem. The likeliest conclusion drawn is that the treatment does not work here.

Treated abroad

Condition
Hypertension
Prescription
Same molecule, same dose
Pack bought
Abroad, from a licensed pharmacy
What was in it
What the label said
Course completed
Yes — as directed, in full

Recovered.

The same prescription, filled from a supply the patient had reason to trust. The difference was never the medicine — it was whether the pack held it.

05 / What it costs the country

Lost trust is an export.

The chain from a failed course of treatment to a drain on foreign reserves is short, and each link follows reasonably from the one before it.

The High Court building in Dhaka.© Dhaka Tribune
The High Court, which in 2023 ordered compensation for the families of 104 children killed by a falsified paracetamol syrup. The cost below is counted in reserves; it is not only counted in reserves.
  1. 01

    Treatment fails

    A course of medicine does not work. Neither the patient nor the prescriber can tell whether the diagnosis, the drug or the product was at fault.

  2. 02

    Trust goes

    Once a failure is suspected to be the medicine itself, confidence in what is sold locally does not recover on its own.

  3. 03

    Patients travel

    Those who can afford it seek treatment abroad — and buy their medicine there too, because that is the part they stopped trusting.

  4. 04

    Reserves leave

    The money goes out twice: once for the treatment, and again for the medicine carried home.

~800,000patients / year

Bangladeshis believed to travel abroad for medical treatment each year. The source states plainly that exact figures are unavailable.[12]

$5bnper year

Spent on treatment abroad annually. A separate estimate, from the Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, puts it at $4 billion.[13]

482,000to India in 2024

Bangladeshis travelling to India for medical purposes — about 52% of all its inbound medical tourists, down from 500,000 in 2023.[13]

What patients spend abroad, against what the state spends on health at home. Both figures are from one sentence of one source.[13]
Where they go.[12]
India
57%
Thailand
20%
Singapore
20%
Elsewhere
3%

Where a forgery is not a financial problem.

In most categories a falsified product costs money and time. In these, it costs the outcome the treatment existed to secure.

Cardiac stents
Implanted once, under emergency conditions, and never inspected again. A substandard device fails inside a patient.
Cancer drugs
Dosage is calculated to the milligram against a narrow therapeutic window. An under-strength vial is an untreated course that looks treated.
Cancer therapy courses
Delivered over months at great cost. A falsified product spends the one window the disease allows.

06 / Today’s defence

Everything on the pack can be printed by whoever printed the pack.

The defences in use today are physical: a distinctive design, a hologram, security printing. Each raises the cost of forgery. None of them changes the fundamental position, which is that the feature is a thing to be looked at — and anything that can be looked at can be reproduced closely enough to pass being looked at.

Sample A

Sample B

One of these is genuine and one is forged. Nothing you can see distinguishes them — and nothing a pharmacist, a wholesaler or a patient can see distinguishes the real pair either.

Distinctive packaging
A pack design a buyer learns to recognise.Reproducible by anyone with the printing equipment the original was made on.
Hologram
An optical feature that is difficult to print.Difficult is not impossible, and the forgery only has to convince someone who has never held a genuine one beside it.
Security printing
Microtext, guilloche, colour-shifting inks.Verifiable only by someone trained and equipped to verify it — which is not the person buying the medicine.

The second defence is enforcement, and it arrives afterwards.

Raids, fines, destroyed stock and, since the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Every one of these is a response to product that has already been made, already been distributed and, in most of the cases below, already been sold. Deterrence is worth having. It is not the same thing as a pack that can be checked before it is swallowed.

Not safe enough.

07 / What we propose

Stop asking the pack to look right. Ask it to prove something only the manufacturer could.

A signature is not a feature of the packaging; it is a mathematical statement about it. A forger with a perfect press still cannot produce one, because producing one requires a private key rather than a printer — and the standards below are chosen so that this stays true once quantum computers can break the cryptography protecting the rest of the chain[17][18].

A FORGER CAN COPYBrand and artworkBatch numberExpiry dateHologramThe printed code itselfVERIFY AGAINST THE PUBLIC KEYSignature over the digestRequires the private key.Never printed on anything.ML-DSA · FIPS 204ML-KEM · FIPS 203Perfect copy. Fails the check.Genuine pack. Passes.
The forgery is not caught by being imperfect. It is caught by being unable to produce something that was never on the pack to be copied.
Nine dose specimens held in inspection rings, each with a spectral trace beneath it; the centre specimen is a vial carrying a data-matrix code.
The model reads the dose — imprint geometry, coating variance, spectral response — and returns a calibrated verdict with the evidence for it.
A capsule and a vial enclosed in a lattice structure inside a faceted shell.
The signature and every custody event behind it are carried on lattice-based cryptography, chosen so authenticity survives the quantum transition.
  1. 01

    Hash

    Every pack gets a unique identifier bound to its batch, its strength and its date, condensed to a fixed digest that changes completely if any of it is altered.

  2. 02

    Sign

    • ML-KEM · FIPS 203
    • ML-DSA · FIPS 204

    The digest is signed with a lattice-based key only the manufacturer holds. A forger can copy the code; they cannot produce a signature that verifies against the manufacturer’s public key.

  3. 03

    Record

    Each custody event — release, distribution, dispensing — is appended to a shared ledger, so a code presented twice in two places is visible as exactly that.

  4. 04

    Explain

    A model reads the pack and returns a calibrated verdict with the evidence for it — which features it weighed and how far each sits from the genuine population — rather than an unexplained yes or no.

References

Where each figure comes from.

  1. [1]

    Know your medicine

    The Daily Star

    www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/know-your-medicine-1243567
  2. [2]

    A comprehensive analysis of selected medicines collected from private drug outlets of Dhaka city, Bangladesh in a simple random survey

    Scientific Reports (Nature) · 2022-01-10

    www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-04309-1
  3. [3]

    Countering counterfeit medicine in Bangladesh

    The Daily Star · 2022-02-27

    www.thedailystar.net/health/news/countering-counterfeit-medicine-bangladesh-2971806
  4. [4]

    Market flooded with counterfeit medicines

    Daily Sun · 2025-12-20

    www.daily-sun.com/bangladesh/847000
  5. [5]

    Health sector in peril as adulterated drugs rampant

    The Business Standard · 2024-04-07

    www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/health/health-sector-peril-adulterated-drugs-rampant-824446
  6. [6]

    Counterfeit medicines flood markets across Bangladesh

    New Age

    www.newagebd.net/article/150157/counterfeit-medicines-flood-markets-across-bangladesh
  7. [7]

    High Court orders to compensate families of 104 children killed by fake syrup

    Dhaka Tribune · 2023-11-15

    www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/court/331118/high-court-orders-to-compensate-families-of-104
  8. [8]

    The deadly world of fake medicine

    The Daily Star

    www.thedailystar.net/the-deadly-world-of-fake-medicine-37915
  9. [9]

    Flour balls for medicines!

    The Daily Star

    www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/flour-balls-medicines-3041201
  10. [10]

    Fake medicine, cosmetics worth Tk 10cr destroyed

    The Daily Star

    www.thedailystar.net/city/news/fake-medicine-cosmetics-worth-tk-10cr-destroyed-1915045
  11. [11]

    Why your drugs don’t work

    The Daily Star

    www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/special-read/news/why-your-drugs-dont-work-1465561
  12. [12]

    To reverse medical tourism, we must strengthen local healthcare

    The Daily Star · 2024

    www.thedailystar.net/opinion/editorial/news/reverse-medical-tourism-we-must-strengthen-local-healthcare-3782891
  13. [13]

    Medical Tourism: Why people go abroad and how Bangladesh can bring them back

    The Business Standard · 2025-10-29

    www.tbsnews.net/supplement/medical-tourism-why-people-go-abroad-and-how-bangladesh-can-bring-them-back-1271926
  14. [14]

    Why Bangladeshis flee for medical treatment, and how to stop it

    The Daily Star

    www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/blowin-the-wind/news/why-bangladeshis-flee-medical-treatment-and-how-stop-it-3841826
  15. [15]

    Bangladeshis spend $4b annually for healthcare abroad

    The Daily Star

    www.thedailystar.net/business/news/bangladeshis-spend-4b-annually-healthcare-abroad-3759816
  16. [16]

    Global surveillance and monitoring system for substandard and falsified medical products

    World Health Organization · 2017

    www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241513425
  17. [17]

    FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard

    NIST · 2024-08-13

    csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final
  18. [18]

    FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard

    NIST · 2024-08-13

    csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final